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+/**
+ * Secrets-not-embedded test — locks in the [E00-S02-T08] guarantee that no
+ * secrets are embedded in the workspace server application image.
+ *
+ * Acceptance criteria covered (each test fails without the committed state):
+ *   - "secrets are not embedded in the image" → the committed
+ *     `apps/server/Dockerfile` declares no secret-bearing `ARG`/`ENV`
+ *     instruction (the only ENV is `NODE_ENV=production`) and every `COPY`
+ *     copies a fixed, non-secret path — never `.env` or credential files, and
+ *     never a blanket `COPY . .` of the whole context; the committed
+ *     `.dockerignore` excludes local env + credential files from the build
+ *     context, so a developer's secret file cannot be embedded even by
+ *     mistake; and the committed files the Dockerfile copies into the image
+ *     contain no default credential values. The mutation probes below prove
+ *     the assertions are non-vacuous (adding a secret ENV/ARG, a credential
+ *     URI value, a `COPY` of `.env`, a blanket `COPY . .`, or dropping a
+ *     `.dockerignore` exclusion breaks the criterion).
+ *   - "image layers contain no secret values" → on machines with Docker, the
+ *     real-image probe builds the committed image from the repo root with a
+ *     marker-bearing probe env file (`.env.t08-*`, excluded by `.dockerignore`)
+ *     present in the build context, then `docker save`s the image, extracts
+ *     every layer (raw + decompressed) and the image config, and confirms
+ *     neither the probe marker nor the compose default credential values
+ *     appear anywhere in the layers.
+ *
+ * Run: `node --test tests/secrets-not-embedded.test.mjs`
+ * (node:test — built into Node >= 18; no dependencies, lockfile untouched.)
+ */
+
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import {
+  existsSync,
+  mkdirSync,
+  mkdtempSync,
+  readdirSync,
+  readFileSync,
+  rmSync,
+  statSync,
+  unlinkSync,
+  writeFileSync,
+} from 'node:fs';
+import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
+import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
+import { gunzipSync } from 'node:zlib';
+import os from 'node:os';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+
+const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), '..');
+
+const read = (relPath) => readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, relPath), 'utf8');
+
+/** The committed app image definition and build context filters under test. */
+const DOCKERFILE_PATH = 'apps/server/Dockerfile';
+const DOCKERIGNORE_PATH = '.dockerignore';
+
+/**
+ * Env/credential path patterns that must never enter the image. The committed
+ * `.dockerignore` must exclude every one of them, and no Dockerfile `COPY` may
+ * target a path matching one. Keep in sync with the committed `.dockerignore`.
+ */
+const SECRET_PATH_PATTERNS = [
+  '.env',
+  '.env.*',
+  '.npmrc',
+  '.netrc',
+  '.credentials',
+  '.aws',
+  '.ssh',
+  'secrets',
+  'secrets/',
+  '*.pem',
+  '*.key',
+  '*.p12',
+  '*.pfx',
+  '*.jks',
+  'id_rsa',
+  'id_ed25519',
+];
+
+/** Default credential values committed in compose.yaml (dev-only defaults). */
+const COMPOSE_CREDENTIAL_VALUES = [
+  'postgres://eppp:eppp@db:5432/eppp',
+  'eppp',
+];
+
+/** Variable names that must never appear on an ARG/ENV instruction. */
+const SECRET_NAME_RE =
+  /(password|passwd|pwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key|apikey|access[_-]?key|auth[_-]?token|client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key|credential|database[_-]?url)\b/i;
+
+/** A credential URI (`scheme://user:pass@host`) embedded as a literal value. */
+const CREDENTIAL_URI_RE = /:\/\/[^/\s]+:[^@\s]+@/;
+
+/** A long random-looking value (JWT/API-key/token-shaped literal). */
+const LONG_SECRET_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/=_-]{32,}$/;
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Dockerfile structure helpers
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Extracts every single-line `ENV`/`ARG` instruction from the committed
+ * Dockerfile. (The committed file uses single-line instructions; like the
+ * repo's block-YAML parser, this supports the subset the committed file uses.)
+ */
+function envArgInstructions(dockerfile) {
+  const instructions = [];
+  for (const line of dockerfile.split(/\r?\n/)) {
+    const match = /^\s*(ENV|ARG)\s+(.+)$/.exec(line);
+    if (match) instructions.push({ kind: match[1], rest: match[2].trim() });
+  }
+  return instructions;
+}
+
+/** Splits one `ENV key=value` / `ENV key value` / `ARG key[=value]` line. */
+function parseInstruction(rest) {
+  const eq = rest.indexOf('=');
+  const sp = rest.search(/\s/);
+  if (eq !== -1 && (sp === -1 || eq < sp)) {
+    return { name: rest.slice(0, eq).trim(), value: rest.slice(eq + 1).trim() };
+  }
+  if (sp !== -1) {
+    return { name: rest.slice(0, sp).trim(), value: rest.slice(sp + 1).trim() };
+  }
+  return { name: rest.trim(), value: '' };
+}
+
+/** Extracts every single-line `COPY` instruction (raw argument list). */
+function copyInstructions(dockerfile) {
+  const copies = [];
+  for (const line of dockerfile.split(/\r?\n/)) {
+    const match = /^\s*COPY\s+(.+)$/.exec(line);
+    if (match) copies.push(match[1].trim());
+  }
+  return copies;
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// dockerignore-style path matching (the subset the committed patterns use)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/** Converts a glob (`*` = non-separator run, `**` = anything, `?` = one char) to a RegExp. */
+function globToRegExp(pattern) {
+  let re = '';
+  for (let i = 0; i < pattern.length; i += 1) {
+    const ch = pattern[i];
+    if (ch === '*') {
+      if (pattern[i + 1] === '*') {
+        re += '.*';
+        i += 1;
+      } else {
+        re += '[^/]*';
+      }
+    } else if (ch === '?') {
+      re += '[^/]';
+    } else {
+      re += ch.replace(/[.+^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
+    }
+  }
+  return new RegExp(`^${re}$`);
+}
+
+/**
+ * True when `relPath` (context-relative, `/` separators) matches a
+ * dockerignore-style pattern: a pattern with no `/` matches any path
+ * component (docker prunes a matched directory, taking its contents); a
+ * trailing `/` restricts to directories (and everything under them); `*`/`**`/
+ * `?` follow docker's glob rules. Supports the subset the committed
+ * `.dockerignore` and the Dockerfile COPY sources use.
+ */
+function matchesDockerignore(relPath, pattern) {
+  const normPath = relPath.replace(/^\.\//, '').replace(/\/+$/, '');
+  let pat = pattern.replace(/^\.\//, '');
+  const dirOnly = pat.endsWith('/');
+  if (dirOnly) pat = pat.slice(0, -1);
+
+  if (dirOnly) {
+    if (pat.includes('/')) {
+      return normPath === pat || normPath.startsWith(`${pat}/`);
+    }
+    // A directory pattern with no slash matches a directory of that name at
+    // any depth — and everything under it (docker prunes matched dirs).
+    const re = globToRegExp(pat);
+    return normPath.split('/').some((component) => re.test(component));
+  }
+
+  const re = globToRegExp(pat);
+  if (!pat.includes('/')) {
+    return normPath.split('/').some((component) => re.test(component));
+  }
+  return re.test(normPath);
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Criterion assertions
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Asserts the committed Dockerfile embeds no secrets:
+ *  - no `ARG`/`ENV` instruction names a secret-bearing variable, embeds a
+ *    credential URI, or embeds a long secret-looking literal (runtime
+ *    credentials belong in Compose environment, never in the image);
+ *  - every `COPY` copies fixed, non-secret paths — none matches a
+ *    `SECRET_PATH_PATTERNS` pattern and none is a blanket copy of the whole
+ *    build context (`COPY . .`) that could sweep env/credential files in.
+ */
+function assertNoSecretsEmbedded(dockerfile) {
+  const instructions = envArgInstructions(dockerfile);
+  for (const { kind, rest } of instructions) {
+    const { name, value } = parseInstruction(rest);
+    assert.doesNotMatch(
+      name,
+      SECRET_NAME_RE,
+      `the Dockerfile must not declare a secret-bearing ${kind} variable (got "${name}") — ` +
+        'runtime credentials belong in Compose environment (compose.yaml), never baked into the image',
+    );
+    assert.doesNotMatch(
+      value,
+      CREDENTIAL_URI_RE,
+      `the Dockerfile ${kind} "${name}" must not embed a credential URI (got "${value}")`,
+    );
+    assert.doesNotMatch(
+      value,
+      LONG_SECRET_RE,
+      `the Dockerfile ${kind} "${name}" must not embed a long secret-looking value (got "${value}")`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  const copies = copyInstructions(dockerfile);
+  assert.ok(
+    copies.length > 0,
+    'the Dockerfile must declare COPY instructions (the app files must reach the image)',
+  );
+  for (const copy of copies) {
+    const tokens = copy.split(/\s+/).filter((token) => !token.startsWith('--from='));
+    const sources = tokens.slice(0, -1).filter((token) => !token.startsWith('/'));
+    for (const src of sources) {
+      assert.notEqual(
+        src.replace(/\/+$/, ''),
+        '.',
+        'the Dockerfile must not COPY the whole build context (COPY . ...) — env/credential files could be swept into the image',
+      );
+      for (const pattern of SECRET_PATH_PATTERNS) {
+        assert.ok(
+          !matchesDockerignore(src, pattern),
+          `the Dockerfile COPY must not copy a secret/credential path (got "${src}", matches "${pattern}")`,
+        );
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Asserts the committed `.dockerignore` excludes every `SECRET_PATH_PATTERNS`
+ * entry, so a developer's env/credential files never enter the build context —
+ * the first line of defense against embedding secrets in the image.
+ */
+function assertDockerignoreExcludesSecrets(dockerignore) {
+  const patterns = dockerignore
+    .split(/\r?\n/)
+    .map((line) => line.trim())
+    .filter((line) => line && !line.startsWith('#'));
+  for (const required of SECRET_PATH_PATTERNS) {
+    assert.ok(
+      patterns.includes(required),
+      `.dockerignore must exclude "${required}" so env/credential files never enter the build context ` +
+        `(got: ${patterns.join(', ')})`,
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Asserts none of the committed files that the Dockerfile copies into the
+ * image contains a default credential value — source-level proof that the
+ * image's inputs carry no secrets.
+ */
+function assertCopiedFilesHaveNoCredentials(contentsByPath) {
+  for (const [relPath, text] of contentsByPath) {
+    for (const needle of COMPOSE_CREDENTIAL_VALUES) {
+      assert.ok(
+        !text.includes(needle),
+        `committed file "${relPath}" (copied into the image) must not contain the default credential value ` +
+          `"${needle}" — a secret would be embedded in the image`,
+      );
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Collects the committed files the Dockerfile COPY instructions pull from the
+ * repo (stage-local `/...` sources and `--from=` flags are ignored) as a
+ * `Map<relPath, text>`. Directories are walked; gitignored build output and
+ * dependency trees are skipped (they are not committed image inputs).
+ */
+function copiedFileContents(dockerfile) {
+  const contents = new Map();
+  const SKIP_DIRS = new Set(['node_modules', '.pnpm-store', 'dist', 'coverage', '.git']);
+
+  const addPath = (relPath) => {
+    const full = path.join(REPO_ROOT, relPath);
+    if (!existsSync(full)) return;
+    const st = statSync(full);
+    if (st.isDirectory()) {
+      for (const entry of readdirSync(full)) {
+        if (SKIP_DIRS.has(entry)) continue;
+        addPath(path.posix.join(relPath, entry));
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+    try {
+      contents.set(relPath, readFileSync(full, 'utf8'));
+    } catch {
+      // unreadable/binary files are not text inputs; skip
+    }
+  };
+
+  for (const copy of copyInstructions(dockerfile)) {
+    const tokens = copy.split(/\s+/).filter((token) => !token.startsWith('--from='));
+    const sources = tokens.slice(0, -1).filter((token) => !token.startsWith('/'));
+    for (const src of sources) {
+      const rel = src.replace(/^\.\//, '');
+      if (rel === '.' || rel === '') continue;
+      addPath(rel);
+    }
+  }
+  return contents;
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Docker probe helpers (integration tests skip cleanly without Docker)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+function run(cmd, args, opts = {}) {
+  return spawnSync(cmd, args, {
+    encoding: 'utf8',
+    timeout: 600_000,
+    ...opts,
+  });
+}
+
+/** True when a reachable Docker daemon exists. */
+function dockerDaemonAvailable() {
+  try {
+    return run('docker', ['info'], { timeout: 15_000 }).status === 0;
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+const DOCKER_DAEMON = dockerDaemonAvailable();
+
+/**
+ * Walks `dir`, returning which of `needles` occur in any file's raw content or
+ * (for gzip-compressed layer blobs) its decompressed content. The image config
+ * JSON is part of the save output, so baked `ENV` secrets are caught too.
+ */
+function anyFileContains(dir, needles) {
+  const needleBufs = needles.map((needle) => Buffer.from(needle, 'utf8'));
+  const found = new Set();
+
+  const walk = (d) => {
+    for (const entry of readdirSync(d)) {
+      const full = path.join(d, entry);
+      const st = statSync(full);
+      if (st.isDirectory()) {
+        walk(full);
+        continue;
+      }
+      const bufs = [readFileSync(full)];
+      const raw = bufs[0];
+      if (raw.length > 2 && raw[0] === 0x1f && raw[1] === 0x8b) {
+        try {
+          bufs.push(gunzipSync(raw));
+        } catch {
+          // not a real gzip stream — raw content is already searched
+        }
+      }
+      for (const buf of bufs) {
+        for (let i = 0; i < needleBufs.length; i += 1) {
+          if (buf.indexOf(needleBufs[i]) !== -1) found.add(needles[i]);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  };
+
+  walk(dir);
+  return [...found];
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Criterion tests
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+test('the app image embeds no secrets (Dockerfile declares no secret ENV/ARG and copies no secret paths)', () => {
+  assert.ok(existsSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, DOCKERFILE_PATH)), `committed ${DOCKERFILE_PATH} must exist`);
+  assertNoSecretsEmbedded(read(DOCKERFILE_PATH));
+});
+
+test('the build context excludes env and credential files (.dockerignore)', () => {
+  assert.ok(
+    existsSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, DOCKERIGNORE_PATH)),
+    `committed ${DOCKERIGNORE_PATH} must exist so local secrets stay out of the build context`,
+  );
+  assertDockerignoreExcludesSecrets(read(DOCKERIGNORE_PATH));
+});
+
+test('the committed files copied into the image contain no default credential values', () => {
+  const dockerfile = read(DOCKERFILE_PATH);
+  const contents = copiedFileContents(dockerfile);
+  assert.ok(contents.size > 0, 'the Dockerfile must copy committed files that the test can scan');
+  assertCopiedFilesHaveNoCredentials(contents);
+});
+
+test('the built image layers contain no secret values (docker build + layer scan)', { skip: !DOCKER_DAEMON }, () => {
+  // Build the committed image from the repo root with a marker-bearing probe
+  // env file in the build context (`.env.t08-*` matches the `.env.*`
+  // exclusion), then scan every layer blob (raw + decompressed) and the image
+  // config for the marker and the compose default credential values.
+  const marker = `T08_PROBE_${randomUUID().replace(/-/g, '')}`;
+  const probeName = `.env.t08-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`;
+  const probePath = path.join(REPO_ROOT, probeName);
+  const tag = `personal-blog:t08-probe-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`;
+  const tmp = mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 't08-layer-scan-'));
+  writeFileSync(probePath, `T08_PROBE_SECRET=${marker}\nPOSTGRES_PASSWORD=${marker}\n`);
+
+  try {
+    const build = run('docker', ['build', '--file', 'apps/server/Dockerfile', '--tag', tag, '.'], {
+      cwd: REPO_ROOT,
+    });
+    assert.equal(
+      build.status,
+      0,
+      `"docker build" must exit 0:\n${(build.stdout || '')}\n${(build.stderr || '')}`.trim(),
+    );
+
+    const save = run('docker', ['save', '--output', path.join(tmp, 'image.tar'), tag], { timeout: 300_000 });
+    assert.equal(
+      save.status,
+      0,
+      `"docker save" must exit 0:\n${(save.stdout || '')}\n${(save.stderr || '')}`.trim(),
+    );
+
+    const extractDir = path.join(tmp, 'extracted');
+    mkdirSync(extractDir, { recursive: true });
+    const untar = run('tar', ['-xf', path.join(tmp, 'image.tar'), '-C', extractDir], { timeout: 300_000 });
+    assert.equal(
+      untar.status,
+      0,
+      `"tar -xf" must exit 0:\n${(untar.stdout || '')}\n${(untar.stderr || '')}`.trim(),
+    );
+
+    const found = anyFileContains(extractDir, [marker, ...COMPOSE_CREDENTIAL_VALUES]);
+    assert.deepEqual(
+      found,
+      [],
+      `the image layers must contain no secret values; found in the image: ${found.join(', ')} ` +
+        `(scan of every layer + image config of "${tag}"; see \`docker history ${tag}\` for the layer list)`,
+    );
+  } finally {
+    try {
+      unlinkSync(probePath);
+    } catch {
+      // probe env file already gone
+    }
+    rmSync(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    run('docker', ['image', 'rm', '-f', tag]);
+  }
+});
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Non-vacuous probes — the assertions above really do fail on violations
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+test('adding a secret-bearing ENV makes the no-secrets criterion fail (mutation probe)', () => {
+  const dockerfile = read(DOCKERFILE_PATH);
+  const mutated = `${dockerfile}\nENV POSTGRES_PASSWORD=not-a-real-secret\n`;
+  assert.throws(() => assertNoSecretsEmbedded(mutated), /POSTGRES_PASSWORD/);
+});
+
+test('adding an ARG with a secret name makes the no-secrets criterion fail (mutation probe)', () => {
+  const dockerfile = read(DOCKERFILE_PATH);
+  const mutated = `${dockerfile}\nARG DATABASE_URL=postgres://eppp:eppp@db:5432/eppp\n`;
+  assert.throws(() => assertNoSecretsEmbedded(mutated), /DATABASE_URL/);
+});
+
+test('embedding a credential URI in an ENV value fails the no-secrets criterion (mutation probe)', () => {
+  const dockerfile = read(DOCKERFILE_PATH);
+  const mutated = dockerfile.replace(
+    'ENV NODE_ENV=production',
+    'ENV NODE_ENV=production\nENV DB_URI=postgres://user:pass@host:5432/db',
+  );
+  assert.notEqual(mutated, dockerfile, 'the mutation must actually add the credential URI ENV');
+  assert.throws(() => assertNoSecretsEmbedded(mutated), /credential URI/);
+});
+
+test('a long secret-looking ENV value fails the no-secrets criterion (mutation probe)', () => {
+  const dockerfile = read(DOCKERFILE_PATH);
+  const mutated = dockerfile.replace(
+    'ENV NODE_ENV=production',
+    'ENV NODE_ENV=production\nENV SOMETHING=abcdef0123456789ABCDEF0123456789abcdef0123456789',
+  );
+  assert.notEqual(mutated, dockerfile, 'the mutation must actually add the long value ENV');
+  assert.throws(() => assertNoSecretsEmbedded(mutated), /long secret-looking/);
+});
+
+test('COPYing .env into the image fails the no-secrets criterion (mutation probe)', () => {
+  const dockerfile = read(DOCKERFILE_PATH);
+  const mutated = dockerfile.replace(
+    'COPY apps/server apps/server',
+    'COPY apps/server apps/server\nCOPY .env .env',
+  );
+  assert.notEqual(mutated, dockerfile, 'the mutation must actually add the .env COPY');
+  assert.throws(() => assertNoSecretsEmbedded(mutated), /\.env/);
+});
+
+test('a blanket COPY of the whole build context fails the no-secrets criterion (mutation probe)', () => {
+  const dockerfile = read(DOCKERFILE_PATH);
+  const mutated = dockerfile.replace('COPY apps/server apps/server', 'COPY . .');
+  assert.notEqual(mutated, dockerfile, 'the mutation must actually add the blanket COPY');
+  assert.throws(() => assertNoSecretsEmbedded(mutated), /whole build context/);
+});
+
+test('removing .env.* from .dockerignore fails the exclusion criterion (mutation probe)', () => {
+  const dockerignore = read(DOCKERIGNORE_PATH);
+  const mutated = dockerignore.replace(/^\.env\.\*\s*$/m, '');
+  assert.notEqual(mutated, dockerignore, 'the mutation must actually remove the .env.* pattern');
+  assert.throws(() => assertDockerignoreExcludesSecrets(mutated), /\.env\.\*/);
+});
+
+test('removing a credential pattern (*.key) from .dockerignore fails the exclusion criterion (mutation probe)', () => {
+  const dockerignore = read(DOCKERIGNORE_PATH);
+  const mutated = dockerignore.replace(/^\*\.key\s*$/m, '');
+  assert.notEqual(mutated, dockerignore, 'the mutation must actually remove the *.key pattern');
+  assert.throws(() => assertDockerignoreExcludesSecrets(mutated), /\.key/);
+});
+
+test('a copied committed file containing a default credential value fails (mutation probe)', () => {
+  const contents = new Map([
+    ['apps/server/src/index.ts', 'const url = "postgres://eppp:eppp@db:5432/eppp";'],
+  ]);
+  assert.throws(() => assertCopiedFilesHaveNoCredentials(contents), /postgres:\/\/eppp:eppp@db:5432\/eppp/);
+});
+
+test('the dockerignore matcher excludes probe env files and keeps source files (parser probe)', () => {
+  assert.ok(matchesDockerignore('.env.t08-probe', '.env.*'), '.env.* must match probe env files');
+  assert.ok(matchesDockerignore('.env', '.env'), '.env must match the exact file');
+  assert.ok(!matchesDockerignore('.env.production', '.env'), '.env must not match .env.production');
+  assert.ok(!matchesDockerignore('apps/server/src/index.ts', '.env'), 'source files must not match .env');
+  assert.ok(matchesDockerignore('secrets/credentials.txt', 'secrets'), 'a path under secrets/ must be excluded');
+  assert.ok(matchesDockerignore('config/secrets/credentials.txt', 'secrets'), 'nested secrets/ dirs must be excluded');
+  assert.ok(matchesDockerignore('config/server.key', '*.key'), '*.key must match a key file at any depth');
+  assert.ok(matchesDockerignore('secrets/credentials.txt', 'secrets/'), 'secrets/ must exclude everything under it');
+  assert.ok(!matchesDockerignore('apps/server/package.json', 'secrets/'), 'source files must not match secrets/');
+});