[E00-S04-T05] .env.example contains placeholders only #404

Merged
kpcto merged 6 commits from feature/186 into main 2026-08-30 05:47:44 +00:00
3 changed files with 57 additions and 9 deletions
Showing only changes of commit f4a282df9e - Show all commits
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@@ -28,8 +28,11 @@ DATABASE_URL=postgres://localhost:5432/eppp
# Admin-session secret — REQUIRED and at least 32 characters (the config # Admin-session secret — REQUIRED and at least 32 characters (the config
# schema's required field; Security-and-Operations §32/§26). Generate a fresh # schema's required field; Security-and-Operations §32/§26). Generate a fresh
# one with `openssl rand -hex 32` and replace the placeholder below. # one with `openssl rand -hex 32` and replace the placeholder below. The
EPPP_SESSION_SECRET=change-me-to-a-random-32-character-secret # placeholder is intentionally SHORTER than the 32-character minimum, so an
# unedited `cp .env.example .env` is rejected at startup (fails closed)
# instead of booting with a publicly known secret.
EPPP_SESSION_SECRET=change-me
# --- Docker Compose overrides (optional — compose.yaml has dev defaults) ------ # --- Docker Compose overrides (optional — compose.yaml has dev defaults) ------
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@@ -294,8 +294,11 @@ jobs:
# source (HOST/PORT/DATABASE_URL/EPPP_SESSION_SECRET), and contains # source (HOST/PORT/DATABASE_URL/EPPP_SESSION_SECRET), and contains
# placeholder values only — no credential URI, no long secret-looking value, # placeholder values only — no credential URI, no long secret-looking value,
# and no compose default credential — with mutation probes proving the # and no compose default credential — with mutation probes proving the
# assertions are non-vacuous. The test needs no dependencies, so the job # assertions are non-vacuous. It also locks the fail-closed EPPP_SESSION_SECRET
# only installs Node. # placeholder (shorter than the schema's 32-character minimum), builds the
# secret-shaped probe at runtime so the branch stays gitleaks-clean, and
# masks raw values in assertion messages. The test needs no dependencies, so
# the job only installs Node.
env-example: env-example:
name: .env.example placeholders only (E00-S04-T05) name: .env.example placeholders only (E00-S04-T05)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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@@ -21,6 +21,17 @@
* assertions are non-vacuous (a secret-looking value, a credential URI, a * assertions are non-vacuous (a secret-looking value, a credential URI, a
* compose default credential, a missing required variable, a dropped * compose default credential, a missing required variable, a dropped
* `!.env.example` negation, or a malformed line all break the criterion). * `!.env.example` negation, or a malformed line all break the criterion).
* - "EPPP_SESSION_SECRET fails closed" → the template's placeholder is
* shorter than the schema's 32-character minimum, so an unedited
* `cp .env.example .env` is rejected at startup instead of booting with a
* publicly known secret (security finding F3; the config-package
* rejection of a change-me marker stays out of scope, E00-S04-T01).
* - "the branch stays gitleaks-clean" → the secret-shaped mutation-probe
* literal is built at runtime from short non-secret fragments, never
* embedded verbatim in the source tree (security finding F2).
* - "assertion messages never echo a raw secret/placeholder value" → every
* message that could carry a value from the template masks it
* (security finding F4).
* *
* Run: `node --test tests/env-example.test.mjs` * Run: `node --test tests/env-example.test.mjs`
* (node:test — built into Node >= 18; no dependencies, lockfile untouched.) * (node:test — built into Node >= 18; no dependencies, lockfile untouched.)
@@ -48,6 +59,16 @@ const FORBIDDEN_VALUES = ['postgres://eppp:eppp@db:5432/eppp'];
/** A long random-looking value (JWT/API-key/token-shaped literal). */ /** A long random-looking value (JWT/API-key/token-shaped literal). */
const LONG_SECRET_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/=_-]{32,}$/; const LONG_SECRET_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/=_-]{32,}$/;
/**
* A long random-looking, secret-shaped value used as a mutation probe. Built
* at runtime by joining short non-secret fragments so no secret-shaped
* literal is ever embedded verbatim in the source tree — the branch stays
* gitleaks-clean (security finding F2).
*/
const SECRET_SHAPED_PROBE = [
'aB3dE', '9fG0h', 'I1jK2', 'lM3nO', '4pQ5r', 'S6tU7', 'vW8xY', '9zA0',
].join('');
/** A credential URI (`scheme://user:pass@host`) embedded as a literal value. */ /** A credential URI (`scheme://user:pass@host`) embedded as a literal value. */
const CREDENTIAL_URI_RE = /:\/\/[^/\s]+:[^@\s]+@/; const CREDENTIAL_URI_RE = /:\/\/[^/\s]+:[^@\s]+@/;
@@ -91,6 +112,17 @@ function isPlaceholderValue(value) {
return false; return false;
} }
/**
* Masks a value for an assertion message (security finding F4): a failing
* assertion echoes a truncated value with its length, never the raw string,
* so a real secret that ever lands in the template cannot leak into CI logs.
*/
function maskValue(value) {
const s = String(value);
if (s.length <= 8) return '<masked>';
return `${s.slice(0, 4)}...<${s.length} chars>`;
}
/** /**
* Parses the template into `{ key, value }` assignments, ignoring blank lines * Parses the template into `{ key, value }` assignments, ignoring blank lines
* and `#` comment lines. Throws a descriptive Error on a malformed line so a * and `#` comment lines. Throws a descriptive Error on a malformed line so a
@@ -104,7 +136,7 @@ function parseAssignments(content) {
const match = /^([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*)=(.*)$/.exec(line); const match = /^([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*)=(.*)$/.exec(line);
if (!match) { if (!match) {
throw new Error( throw new Error(
`line ${index + 1} is not a comment, blank line, or KEY=value assignment: "${raw}"`, `line ${index + 1} is not a comment, blank line, or KEY=value assignment: "${maskValue(raw)}"`,
); );
} }
assignments.push({ key: match[1], value: match[2] }); assignments.push({ key: match[1], value: match[2] });
@@ -121,7 +153,7 @@ function assertTemplateHasPlaceholdersOnly(content) {
for (const forbidden of FORBIDDEN_VALUES) { for (const forbidden of FORBIDDEN_VALUES) {
assert.ok( assert.ok(
!content.includes(forbidden), !content.includes(forbidden),
`the template must not contain the compose default credential value "${forbidden}"`, `the template must not contain the compose default credential value "${maskValue(forbidden)}"`,
); );
} }
@@ -141,7 +173,7 @@ function assertTemplateHasPlaceholdersOnly(content) {
for (const { key, value } of assignments) { for (const { key, value } of assignments) {
assert.ok( assert.ok(
isPlaceholderValue(value), isPlaceholderValue(value),
`"${key}" must be a placeholder value, got: "${value}"`, `"${key}" must be a placeholder value, got: "${maskValue(value)}"`,
); );
} }
} }
@@ -168,6 +200,16 @@ test('.env.example contains placeholders only and no real secret values', () =>
assertTemplateHasPlaceholdersOnly(read(ENV_EXAMPLE_PATH)); assertTemplateHasPlaceholdersOnly(read(ENV_EXAMPLE_PATH));
}); });
test("EPPP_SESSION_SECRET's placeholder is shorter than the schema's 32-character minimum (fails closed)", () => {
const content = read(ENV_EXAMPLE_PATH);
const match = /^EPPP_SESSION_SECRET=(.*)$/m.exec(content);
assert.ok(match, 'the template must document EPPP_SESSION_SECRET');
assert.ok(
match[1].length < 32,
`the EPPP_SESSION_SECRET placeholder must be shorter than the schema's 32-character minimum so an unedited cp .env.example .env is rejected at startup (got ${match[1].length} chars)`,
);
});
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Non-vacuous probes — the assertions above really do fail on violations // Non-vacuous probes — the assertions above really do fail on violations
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -188,8 +230,8 @@ test('a compose default credential value in the template fails the criterion (mu
test('a long secret-looking value fails the criterion (mutation probe)', () => { test('a long secret-looking value fails the criterion (mutation probe)', () => {
const content = read(ENV_EXAMPLE_PATH); const content = read(ENV_EXAMPLE_PATH);
const mutated = content.replace( const mutated = content.replace(
'EPPP_SESSION_SECRET=change-me-to-a-random-32-character-secret', 'EPPP_SESSION_SECRET=change-me',
'EPPP_SESSION_SECRET=aB3dE9fG0hI1jK2lM3nO4pQ5rS6tU7vW8xY9zA0', `EPPP_SESSION_SECRET=${SECRET_SHAPED_PROBE}`,
); );
assert.notEqual(mutated, content, 'the mutation must actually replace the session secret'); assert.notEqual(mutated, content, 'the mutation must actually replace the session secret');
assert.throws(() => assertTemplateHasPlaceholdersOnly(mutated), /placeholder/); assert.throws(() => assertTemplateHasPlaceholdersOnly(mutated), /placeholder/);